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DOES THE ARGUMENT FROM EVIL ASSUME A 
CONSEQUENTIALIST MORALITY? 
Eric Reitan 
In this paper, I argue that the some of the most popular and influential for-
mulations of the Argument from Evil (AE) assume a moral perspective that 
is essentially consequentialist, and would therefore be unacceptable to 
deontologists. Specifically, I examine formulations of the argument offered 
by William Rowe and Bruce Russell, both of whom explicitly assert that 
their formulation of AE is theoretically neutral with respect to consequen-
tialism, and can be read in a way that is unobjectionable to deontologists. I 
argue that, in fact, this in not the case. Finally, I look at the implications of 
the consequentialist assumptions of AE for theodicies based on free will. 
Introduction 
In this paper, I argue that the Argument from Evil (AE), at least in its most 
popular formulations, makes a controversial and hence unwarranted 
assumption about the nature of morality, and hence about what it means for 
God to be morally perfect.1 In particular, I argue that a key moral premise of 
AE, put forward by some of the strongest advocates of the argument, 
assumes an essentially consequentialist understanding of morality. The ten-
dency to adopt (or leave unchallenged) such a consequentialist premise is 
widespread in scholarship on AE, perhaps because most recent philosophi-
cal attention has been directed towards the epistemic issues surrounding 
AE.2 My broader objective, then, is to encourage more serious philosophical 
attention to the moral dimensions of the problem of evil.3 My suspicion, 
which I will not defend in any detail here, is that AE can be properly evaluat-
ed only from the standpoint of a clearly articulated moral framework, and 
that theists who are in the business of responding to the problem of evil 
should therefore evaluate AE in the light of the moral system they embrace. 
The Moral Underpinnings of the Argument from Evil 
For my purposes, the Argument from Evil (AE) will refer generically to 
any argument which purports to show that 
(E) Evil exists in the world 
counts against 
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(G) There exists an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being, or 
"God." 
The evil referred to in E may be either evil as such or some or all of its par-
ticular real-world manifestations. It should be noted that there is not just 
one argument against theism based on the existence of evil, but rather a 
cluster of such arguments, and to refer to this cluster as the Argument from 
Evil may be a bit misleading. Nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity I will 
do so here, and refer to specific arguments which fall under the heading of 
AE as versions or fonns of AE. 
Contemporary scholarship on AE tends to distinguish between the "log-
ical" AE (LAE) and the "evidential" AE (EAE). LAE refers to any argument 
which purports to show that E is incompatible with G. EAE refers to any 
argument which purports to show that E counts as compelling evidence 
against G, such that not-G is the most reasonable conclusion to draw based 
on the evidence.4 
LAE is perhaps the oldest and most traditional form of the argument. 
More than forty years ago, J.L. Mackie, in defending LAE, rightly pointed 
out that G and E are not logically incompatible by themselves. Rather, 
taken together with certain other (unstated) premises, they imply a contra-
diction.s In particular, one must add premises which logically link omnipo-
tence and moral perfection to evil. We can, for example, render the argu-
ment valid by adding the following premises: 
(0) An omnipotent, omniscient being is capable of eliminating all evil 
(MP) A morally perfect being would eliminate all evil that He is capa-
ble of eliminating. 
G, 0, and MP jointly imply that no evil exists. But, according to E, evil 
does exist. If we assume that 0 and MP are necessarily true, then the con-
tradiction can be avoided only by rejecting either G or E-but, since we 
know from experience that E is true, the argument concludes that we must 
reject G. Hence, God as defined does not exist. This, then, constitutes at 
least one version of LAE. 
It is not my intention here to offer an exhaustive critique of this argu-
ment. As stated the argument is fatally flawed in a number of ways: both 0 
and MP are problematic premises.6 LAE has been critiqued and refined in 
the light of criticism, and, more recently, has been replaced by EAE in the 
light of telling objections.7 What I want to call attention to here is the 
dependence of LAE on MP or some premise like MP. No valid version of AE 
can get by without some premise that explicates moral perfection in terms 
of a propensity to eliminate evil. And this is true even if one is offering an 
"evidential" AE-an argument to the effect that the truth of E gives us good 
reason to believe that G is probably false, even if E and G are not strictly 
incompatible.s Clearly, E would give us no reason, probabilistic or other-
wise, to believe that G is false unless we assume that part of what it means 
to be morally perfect is to have some kind of propensity to eliminate evil. 
MP does not rightly capture that propensity, since it is clear that a morally 
perfect being might have morally compelling reasons to let some particular 
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evil persisU On the basis of such criticisms of MP, defenders of AE have 
adopted an alternative moral premise which, today, has become an almost 
universal presupposition in current versions of AE.1O That premise can be 
articulated as follows: 
(MPE): A morally perfect being would eliminate, as far as He was 
able, all evils that could be eliminated without producing a greater 
evil or losing a greater good; that is, He would eliminate all pointless 
or gratuitous evil. 
While there are a variety of contemporary versions of AE, it seems that 
each of them relies on an assumption substantially the same as MPE. This 
assumption is typically put forward as uncontroversial, and critics of AE 
do not usually challenge the argument on this point. Hence, responses to 
AE have tended to focus either on whether the evils in the world are gen-
uinely gratuitous,!! or, more recently, on what kind of epistemic warrant 
the apparent pointlessness of some evils lends against theistic belief.12 
To see the centrality of MPE in discussions of AE, it is useful to look at 
William Rowe's article, "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of 
Atheism," which has come to be widely acknowledged as a seminal articu-
lation of EAE.13 In the article, Rowe summarizes AE as a two premise argu-
ment, using "intense suffering" as a specific instance of evil on the basis of 
which he seeks to challenge God's existence. The argument as put forward 
by Rowe is as follows: 
1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, 
omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing 
some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence 
of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without 
thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally 
bad or worse. 
3. There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good 
being.!4 
Rowe takes (2) to be obviously true, almost a kind of definitional explica-
tion of what it means to be wholly good (or, in my terms, morally perfect). 
He then proceeds to provide a probabilistic argument for (1). In effect, he 
gives us (non-conclusive) reasons to believe (1). He then goes on to argue 
that, in the absence of equally or more compelling reasons to believe G, the 
probability that (1) is true means that it is more reasonable to believe not-G 
(or [3]) than it is to believe G. Most subsequent discussion of AE has turned 
on either the strength of the non-conclusive reasons for (1) or the legitima-
cy of the epistemic assumptions that lead us to consider such a probabilis-
tic argument compelling.!S 
But this discussion leaves (2) untouched. Indeed, Rowe goes so far as to 
say that (2) is so obviously compelling that "it's clear that the theist can 
reject this atheistic argument only by rejecting its first premise. "16 
Premise (2) of Rowe's argument is substantially the same as MPE, any 
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differences being explicable in terms of the contextual demands of the 
argument. In any event, the similarity between (2) and MPE is such that 
the critical comments I have to make with respect to MPE would apply as 
well to (2). 
Rowe has developed and refined his version of EAE in subsequent arti-
cles, but has not backed away from (2). For the sake of simplicity, however, 
both Rowe and his commentators have taken "losing some greater good" 
to include "permitting some evil equally bad or worse," thereby simplify-
ing the formulation of (2). Subsequent discussion of the evidence for (1) has 
likewise been simplified, and the key question in the debate has become 
whether, for every evil that exists, there are goods we know of which "jus-
tify" these evils, or whether there are no such goods and hence no reason 
to think that (at least some of) these evils are anything but gratuitous. 
"Goods" in such discussion are intended to include such things as evil pre-
vention and elimination.17 
The Consequentialist Nature of MPE 
The tendency for theists and other critics of AE to leave MPE unchal-
lenged strikes me as a mistake. If we look closely, we will see that MPE is 
not as uncontroversial as it might at first appear to be. 
One fairly uncontroversial way to characterize a morally perfect being 
would be to say that, at the very least, such a being would never do, either 
by commission or omission, what is morally impermissible (and hence 
would always do what is morally obligatory). In more theological terms, 
such a being would never sin. Typically, however, we would add to this 
that morally perfect beings would practice all acts which it is morally better 
to do than not to do (and of which they were capable)-all acts which it 
would, so to speak, be morally nice to do, even if not strictly obligatory. 
Likewise, morally perfect beings would eschew acts which it is morally 
better to avoid. For example, while it might be morally permissible to ignore 
the plight of a beggar one encounters in the street, a morally perfect being 
would not do so, because it is morally better to help. Adherents of MPE, 
then, presumably have one of two reasons for believing that a morally per-
fect God would eliminate all gratuitous evil: first, because it is morally 
obligatory to eliminate gratuitous evils that one knows about and can elim-
inate (and morally impermissible not to do so), and a morally perfect being 
always does what is morally obligatory; or second, because it is morally 
better to eliminate such an evil than to let it persist, and a morally perfect 
being always does what is morally better. This second interpretation of 
MPE is broader than the first, since every action that is obligatory is also an 
action that it is morally better to do than not do, but not vice versa. Under 
the second interpretation of MPE, a perfect God would do all those things 
that are obligatory and all those things that are morally better but not oblig-
atory. Hereafter, I will assume the broader second interpretation of MPE. 
By all surface appearances, MPE assumes an essentially consequentialist 
view of morality. Consider Rowe's claim that his version of MPE follows 
from a complex disjunctive conditional spelling out the necessary condi-
tions for an omniscient, morally perfect being (OG) to refrain from prevent-
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ing an evil (sl) that OG could prevent. Rowe claims that OG would fail to 
prevent sl only if 
Either (i) there is some greater good, GG, such that GG is obtainable 
by OG only if OG permits sl, 
or (ii) there is some greater good, GG, such that GG is obtainable by 
OG only if OG permits either sl or some evil equally bad or worse, 
or (iii) s1 is such that it is preventable by OG only if OG permits some 
evil equally bad or worse.18 
Here, Rowe is roughly saying that the moral status of evil-preventing 
acts is evaluated by reference to the overall balance of good over evil which 
such acts produce. If the evil-preventing act improves the overall balance 
of good over evil, then it is morally better to do than not (the evil in this 
case would be a gratuitous evil); if it worsens that balance (by producing a 
greater evil or leading to the loss of a greater good), it is morally better not 
to do it (the evil in this case might be regarded as a necessary evil). It is this 
presupposition about the nature of morality which leads us to conclude 
that a morally perfect being would act as indicated in MPE. 
In short, MPE presupposes that the moral status of evil-eliminating acts 
is determined by the overall balance of good over evil that such an act pro-
duces. And this certainly sounds like a consequentialist perspective. As 
such, it is open to being rejected by deontologists, who hold that there exist 
nonconsequentialist moral constraints on action which remain in force 
even when violating those constraints is necessary in order to achieve the 
best results. '9 While there are a variety of deontological moral theories, 
what these theories have in common is that producing the best results is 
not the only relevant moral consideration in assessing the rightness of an 
act-that the moral rightness of an action, while it may be influenced by 
considerations of the overall goodness produced by the act, is not always 
wholly determined by this overall balance of good over evil, because, at least 
sometimes, there are other morally relevant factors that may override the 
consideration of consequences.20 
Put another way, a deontological moral theory is one which holds that, 
at least sometimes, there is something about the act itself, apart from the 
overall goodness of its consequences, that is decisive in assessing the 
action's moral rightness. For most deontologists, this decisive factor is that 
the action is of a certain type, a type of which all instances are subject to a 
moral rule which applies even when violation of that rule would produce 
the best results. 2! 
While the classification of an action as being of a certain type may 
depend upon some of the consequences of which it is immediately produc-
tive (for example, whether the act of shooting one's neighbor is to be classi-
fied as murder depends upon whether the neighbor dies), these conse-
quences may be regarded as intrinsic features of the act, in the sense that 
they help to define what kind of act it is, and should be distinguished from 
those consequences which do not go into the classification of the act as 
being of the given type.22 In a certain sense, then, deontologists do attend to 
some of the consequences of an act in order to determine its moral right-
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ness. But while a consequentialist moral theory determines the rightness of 
an act by reference to all the consequences, a deontological theory holds 
that the rightness of at least some acts is determined exclusively by refer-
ence to those consequences which are intrinsic features of the act in the 
indicated sense. Hereafter, for the sake of brevity, I will characterize deon-
tology as the view that, at least sometimes, an act has an intrinsic moral 
character that overrides consequentialist considerations in determining the 
action's moral rightness. By the "intrinsic moral character" of an act, I 
mean the character that an act has of falling under a moral rule by virtue of 
its intrinsic features. An act is "intrinsically right (obligatory)" if, by virtue 
of its intrinsic features, it falls under a moral rule requiring the perfor-
mance of the act. It is "intrinsically wrong" if it falls under a rule prohibit-
ing its performance. 
From a deontological moral perspective, then, there might be acts which 
it is morally worse to do because they are intrinsically wrong, even though 
they eliminate gratuitous evil. And yet MPE appears to deny this possibili-
ty by implying that the moral status of evil-eliminating acts is entirely 
determined by the overall balance of good over evil which these acts pro-
duce. 
Nevertheless, Rowe and other advocates of MPE have denied that MPE 
need be read in this consequentialist way, maintaining that it is theoretical-
ly neutral with respect to consequentialism. In a footnote, Rowe instructs 
us to include moral principles in the extension of "good," such that, for 
example, "the satisfaction of certain principles of justice may be a good that 
outweighs the evil of s1."23 Presumably, Rowe thinks that if we read 
"good" in such a way, MPE is rendered theoretically neutral and unobjec-
tionable to deontologists (because it incorporates the deontologists' con-
cern for moral rules). 
Rowe is not the only one to notice that MPE can easily be read as assum-
ing a consequentialist perspective, and to attempt to stave off possible 
objections by explicitly allowing deontological considerations to count as 
"outweighing goods." Bruce Russell, in "The Persistent Problem of Evil," 
constructs an EAE based on a very specific evil: the brutal murder of a little 
girl in Flint, Michigan.24 A crucial premise in his argument, identified as 
premise 11 in Russell's article, is the following: 
(11) If there was no outweighing good that morally justified letting 
the little girl in Flint be brutally murdered, then God should have 
prevented that murder from happening.25 
Russell takes (11) to be a necessary truth, presumably following from some 
principle like MPE. To be precise, the sense of moral perfection implicit in 
(11) is the following: 
(R) A morally perfect being would prevent an evil He knew about 
and could eliminate unless there was some outweighing good that 
morally justified letting it happen. 
When "outweighing good" is construed to include the prevention or elirni-
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nation of greater evil, as is typically done in these discussions (and as 
Russell explicitly asks us to do), R is obviously tantamount to MPE. 
Russell recognizes that someone might criticize MPE on the grounds 
that "it can be permissible to allow an evil to occur where allowing it is 
needed in order to fulfill a duty or to satisfy some other deontological 
requirement."26 Russell, however, does not see this objection as problemat-
ic. "I accept this anti-teleological objection," he says, "and simply ask the 
reader to construe 'outweighing good' broadly enough to include deonto-
logical considerations."27 With this "expansion" of the meaning of "out-
weighing good," Russell, like Rowe, thinks he has satisfactorily undercut 
the objection. But is this move sufficient? 
I think that it is not. So long as we continue to use terms such as "greater 
good" or "outweighing good" to characterize what is going to count as a 
satisfactory moral justification for permitting evil, our tendency will be to 
evaluate a proposed moral justification by asking whether the moral con-
sideration raised genuinely "outweighs" the evil that is allowed in its 
name, and by rejecting as inadequate each moral consideration that does 
not outweigh the evil. But this procedure is appropriate only from an 
essentially consequentialist moral perspective. 
To see this, let us consider what it would mean to follow Rowe's and 
Russell's suggestion and construe "outweighing good" so as to "include 
deontological considerations." The most obvious way to go about includ-
ing deontological considerations would be to say that the intrinsic moral 
character of an act should be one of those goods which can, sometimes, 
outweigh the goodness of eliminating an evil. In terms of MPE, one of the 
"greater goods" that might warrant a perfect being in refraining from elim-
inating an evil would be avoiding the intrinsic wrongness of the evil-elimi-
nating act. Why isn't this a simple clarification of MPE so as to make it 
more theoretically neutral? 
As noted above, to embrace a deontological moral perspective is to hold 
that, at least sometimes, an action possesses what I am calling an intrinsic 
moral character, and that this intrinsic character overrides any consequen-
tialist considerations which might be offered for or against performing the 
action. Thus, if an action is intrinsically immoral, it is immoral no matter 
how much good it does (or how much evil it eliminates). 
In interpreting the claim that the intrinsic immorality of an action over-
rides its good effects, it is a mistake to hold that "overrides" means the 
same as what is ordinarily meant by "outweighs." Understood in anything 
like the ordinary sense, to say that the intrinsic immorality of an act out-
weighs its good effects is to say that the intrinsic immorality of an act is an 
evil which is greater than the good produced by the act. But to say this is, 
in effect, to turn the intrinsic immorality of the act into one of the conse-
quences to be considered in evaluating whether or not the act produces the 
best results. It turns deontology into a species of consequentialism, one that 
happens to include in the scope of consideration the intrinsic moral charac-
ter of acts (and therefore doesn't demand that the relevant consequences be 
temporally subsequent to the act itself). 
But when the intrinsic immorality of an act is just one consequence of 
the act to be weighed against others, it then becomes possible, at least in 
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theory, for the other good consequences of the act to outweigh its intrinsic 
immorality, thereby rendering the action moral-an outcome that violates 
the definition of a deontological moral perspective as laid out above. This 
outcome could be avoided only if we assume that the intrinsic immorality 
of an act is such a great evil that it could never be outweighed by any of the 
act's external consequences, no matter how good. But this assumption is 
unreasonable for a number of reasons, the most important being this: We 
can conceive of cases in which performing an intrinsically immoral act 
would prevent several others from performing the very same act. In any 
such case, the evil consequences of not performing the act would outweigh 
the intrinsic evil of the act no matter how great we took that evil to be, 
since that intrinsic evil would be magnified in the consequences. 
Hence, to say that the intrinsic immorality of an act overrides its good 
effects is not to say that it outweighs these effects. Rather, it is to say that, 
given the intrinsic immorality of the act, all consequentialist considerations 
for or against the act become irrelevant, even if those considerations would 
be utterly compelling in the absence of the intrinsic immorality. For a deon-
tologist, if an action is intrinsically immoral, then it is wrong even if the evil 
intrinsic to such an action being done is far less serious than the evil which 
would be prevented by its performance.28 From a deontological perspec-
tive, then, it is quite possible for an evil-eliminating action to be immoral 
even though there is no outweighing good served by refraining from the act. 
Hence, it is quite possible for a morally perfect being to refrain from elimi-
nating evils even when the "good" served by such restraint is a rather 
modest good compared to the evil that could have been eliminated. From a 
deontological perspective, this kind of comparison is irrelevant. 
And it is the irrelevance of this kind of comparative weighing procedure 
which is missed when we adopt Rowe's and Russell's suggestion of con-
struing "outweighing good" broadly enough to include deontological con-
siderations among the goods in question. So long as we think of deontolog-
ical considerations as factors that are to be "weighed" against others, we 
miss the point of deontology. It may well be true that no deontological rule 
is such that the good of obeying it outweighs the horrible evils in the 
world. A deontologist could readily accept that the horrible evil of the little 
girl in Flint being murdered outweighs the good of God's obedience to 
whatever moral principle kept Him from intervening. But, the deontologist 
would continue, even though the good of obedience to the principle is 
modest compared to the evil that could have been prevented by disobedi-
ence, the principle is not the sort that can be outweighed by such teleologi-
cal concerns: the action prohibited is intrinsically wrong no matter what 
the consequences, and so a morally perfect God would refrain from per-
fonning the action no matter how much it might pain Him to watch the 
evil continue. Whereas a less perfect being might break down and violate 
the principle because the consequences of doing so are appealing, it is 
God's very perfection which causes Him to let the evil continue, even 
though the evil is gratuitous and permitting it serves no greater good. 
In short, even if we follow the advice of Rowe and Russell, and construe 
"good" in such a way as to include deontological moral principles, we will 
still be embracing an essentially consequentialist moral perspective so long 
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as the question we ask about these deontological principles is whether obe-
dience to them is so great a good as to outweigh the evils permitted in the 
name of obedience. For a deontologist, this is the wrong sort of question to 
ask. And for a theodicist, therefore, the search for "outweighing goods" to 
explain why God permits the evils He does is too restrictive. If one adopts 
a deontological morality, there is a whole class of possible moral justifica-
tions which theodicists tend to overlook. 
Put another way, the question most frequently asked in connection with 
AE is this one: "Is there some outweighing good which justifies God in 
permitting each of the evils in the world?" And this question amounts to 
asking whether or not there is some evil in the world which is pointless-
which is such that no outweighing good is served by it. Advocates of AE 
have tended to hold that if we have good reason to believe that there is 
pointless evil, then we have good reason to believe that there is no God. A 
deontologist would object to this inference on the grounds that, even if we 
have good reason to believe that there is pointless evil, there is a further 
question we need to ask. That question is this: "Is there any non-conse-
quentialist moral obligation which prevents God from intervening to pre-
vent or eliminate the pointless evil in the world?" It is this further question 
which is obscured by Rowe's and Russell's quick treahuent of deontology. 
So long as we speak in terms of outweighing goods, our tendency will be to 
think in terms of outweighing goods-and the mere inclusion of the intrin-
sic moral character of actions among the candidates for outweighing goods 
does nothing to change this. In order to think deontologically, we need to 
start asking the further deontological question that remains to be answered 
even once we have concluded that no outweighing good justifies permit-
ting a given evil. 
The Case of Free Will 
One might be tempted to dismiss the significance of this oversight if one 
fails to consider the impact it has had on some actual discussions. 
Consider, as an example, the theodicies based on free will. Essentially, 
these theodicies seek to show that at least some of the evils that exist in the 
world (the moral evils) are not pointless, because these evils cannot be 
eliminated without eliminating the free will of those who are responsible 
for them, and permitting the free exercise of their wills is a greater good. 
The good of free will, in short, outweighs these evils. But a defender of AE 
can argue that the goodness of free will is not so obviously great that it out-
weighs all of the horrific moral evils in the world. 
This is precisely what Bruce Russell has done, in responding to 
Swinburne's version of the free will theodicy. Russell quite rightly notes 
that, while free will may well be seen as valuable, it is hardly "so valuable 
that it could justify someone in permitting suffering like that endured by 
the little girl in Flint."29 More precisely, Russell argues that while a world 
where people have significant freedom to act may well be better than a 
world without significant freedom, it doesn't follow that a world in which 
God never intervenes to prevent the evils brought on by human freedom is 
better than a world in which God does so intervene. And even if we 
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assume that God does sometimes intervene to prevent the evils that would 
otherwise result from free acts, it seems that God could certainly intervene 
more often than He does without significantly undermining human free-
dom and making the world a worse place. In particular, preserving the free 
will of the man who brutally murdered the little girl in Flint can hardly be 
viewed as so great a good as to justify that little girl's suffering. li) Again, 
was the free will of the Nazis so valuable that the good of preserving their 
free will outweighed the evil of the Holocaust? There is no good reason to 
think so. Hence, there is no good reason to think that, in every case where 
free will is exercised, the good of preserving it outweighs the evil that is 
permitted in its name. 
The fact that Russell takes this response to be sufficient demonstrates 
quite plainly that, for all his willingness to include deontological considera-
tions among the "outweighing goods" that could justify allowing some 
evil, he does not see what it means to think deontologically about the sub-
ject. A deontologist is not primarily concerned with whether or not the free 
will of moral agents is so great a good as to outweigh the evils that one 
must permit in order not to interfere with the exercise of their free will. 
That is consequentialist thinking.3! What the deontologist wants to know, 
simply put, is this: Is it intrinsically morally permissible to interfere with 
some person's free will in order to prevent some evil, or is the act of inter-
fering with that person's free will intrinsically immoral, such that no 
amount of evil prevention could even in theory justify it? Of course, what 
is intrinsically morally permissible may be a function of the nature of one's 
relationships or other subject-specific considerations, such that, for the pur-
poses of theodicy, the key deontological question becomes whether it is 
intrinsically permissible for God to interfere in His creatures' exercise of 
their free will, given their nature and the telos for which He made them.32 If 
not, then in circumstances where the only way for God to prevent an evil 
would be through interference with someone's free will, God, as a morally 
perfect being, would permit the evil even if it were unimaginably horri-
ble.33 If, as seems plausible, some interference in the exercise of human free 
will would be necessary in order to prevent the Holocaust,'4 then God 
would permit the Holocaust even though no greater good is served by it. 
In short, in order to evaluate the free will theodicy, we do not merely 
need some account of the value of free will, but also some account of which 
deontological moral principles (if any) regulate actions, especially divine 
actions, that affect the exercise of human free will. Such an account cannot 
be provided without explicating one's moral theory. For example, it seems 
likely that a strong version of Christian Pacifism would put greater deonto-
logical constraints on the intrusion into free will than would the moral the-
ory underlying the Just War tradition.35 
Conclusion 
It seems, then, that no treatment of AE should be divorced from some 
explication of the moral theory according to which one spells out what a 
morally perfect being would do. We have seen that, despite their efforts to 
the contrary, advocates of AE adopt moral premises which, in their word-
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ing and application, imply a moral perspective that is not theoretically neu-
tral, but in fact consequentialist. Simple instructions to construe these 
premises as theoretically neutral are insufficient. A better formulation of 
the key moral premise of AE would be the following: 
(MPE'): A morally perfect being would eliminate, as far as He was 
able, all evils that could be eliminated without producing a greater 
evil, or losing a greater good, or violating any active deontological moral 
requirements. 
But even MPE' is not entirely satisfactory, since in order to fully under-
stand what a morally perfect being would do we would need a moral theo-
ry to tell us which deontological principles can and do influence the moral-
ity of God's evil-eliminating acts. The most obvious source for such a 
moral theory would be the religious traditions which are the target of AE. 
Indeed, the extent to which a religious tradition's moral theory limits the 
scope of the problem of evil may well be one measure of its acceptability. 
In any event, it is clear that if we replace MPE with MPE', a valid ver-
sion of AE would have to include the additional premise that there are no 
active deontological moral requirements that God would violate by pre-
venting all gratuitous evil. This is a premise that is not obviously true, and 
hence deserves careful philosophical scrutiny. Thus, by clearing away the 
consequentialist presuppositions of the argument we open up a new line of 
inquiry, one that ought to occupy an important place in future dialogue 
concerning AE. 
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of love does not apply in the same way to creatures; it follows from the particu-
lar features of the God-creature relationship. See Simone Weil, Gravity and 
Grace (Lincoln, NA: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), p. 78. 
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impotent to affect the world). But if we adopt the broader sense of free will that 
is presupposed by free will theodicists, then it would seem to be impossible for 
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